Does referral-based hiring exacerbate agency problems? 基于推荐的招聘会加剧代理问题吗?

时间:2022-04-21         阅读:

光华讲坛——海外名家讲堂第41期

主题:Does referral-based hiring exacerbate agency problems? 基于推荐的招聘会加剧代理问题吗?

主讲人:墨尔本大学 Chung-Yu Hung助理教授

主持人:澳门沙龙赌场会计学院 王志副教授

时间: 2022年5月10日(周二)15:00—16:30

举办地点:腾讯会议 ID:759 943 184

主办单位:会计学院 国际交流与合作处 科研处

主讲人简介

Chung-Yu Hung is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Melbourne. Her research is primarily focused on managerial accounting issues within firms. She is interested in understanding the behaviors of economic agents (e.g., managers and employees) in different contracting environments with a view to learn how firm-specific management practices are shaped and their portability across firms. Her works use field archival data to study the inner workings of firms.

She holds a Ph.D. in Accounting from Tilburg University. She has published research papers in journals such as The Accounting Review, Management Science, and Journal of Management Accounting Research.

Chung Yu Hung,墨尔本大学会计学助理教授。她的研究兴趣主要集中于公司内部的管理会计问题,特别是经济代理人(如经理和员工)在不同合同环境中的行为,以了解企业具体管理实践是如何形成的,以及它们在企业间的可移植性。她使用实地档案数据来研究公司的内部运作。

Chung Yu Hung于蒂尔堡大学取得会计学博士学位。她曾在《The Accounting Review》、《Management Science》和《Journal of Management Accounting Research》等期刊上发表学术论文。

内容简介

We investigate circumstances in which referral-based hiring can exacerbate rather than mitigate agency problems. When incentive contracts cannot fully align employees’ incentives with the interests of the firm, employees may behave opportunistically. Referred job candidates likely obtain inside information from existing employees about opportunistic incentive responses and it is this information that exacerbates agency problems. Our research setting enables us to distinguish between referred and non-referred employees. It also features a context in which the incentive contract consists of two measures with different properties (efficiency and quality), which allow for opportunistic incentive responses, i.e., sacrificing quality for efficiency. We find that referred employees focus more on efficiency and less on quality than non-referred employees. We further document the persistence of this behavior and the differential departure likelihood of referred and non-referred employees. Our findings suggest that referral-based hiring can exacerbate agency problems when incentive contracts allow for opportunistic gains.

我们研究了基于推荐的招聘会加剧而不是减轻代理问题的情况。当激励合同不能完全使员工的目标与公司的利益保持一致时,员工可能会表现出机会主义行为。被推荐的求职者可能会从现有员工那里获得有关机会主义激励反应的内部信息,而正是这些信息加剧了代理问题。我们的研究场景使我们能够区分推荐和非推荐员工。而且该场景中激励合同由具有不同属性(效率和质量)的两种措施组成,这允许机会主义的激励反应,即牺牲质量换取效率。我们发现被推荐的员工比非推荐的员工更注重效率而不是质量。我们进一步研究了这种行为的持续性以及推荐和非推荐员工的不同离职可能性。我们的研究结果表明,当激励合同允许机会主义收益时,基于推荐的招聘会加剧代理问题。