Does referral-based hiring exacerbate agency problems? 基于推荐的招聘会加剧代理问题吗?

时间:2022-04-21         阅读:


主题:Does referral-based hiring exacerbate agency problems? 基于推荐的招聘会加剧代理问题吗?

主讲人:墨尔本大学 Chung-Yu Hung助理教授

主持人:澳门沙龙赌场会计学院 王志副教授

时间: 2022年5月10日(周二)15:00—16:30

举办地点:腾讯会议 ID:759 943 184

主办单位:会计学院 国际交流与合作处 科研处


Chung-Yu Hung is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Melbourne. Her research is primarily focused on managerial accounting issues within firms. She is interested in understanding the behaviors of economic agents (e.g., managers and employees) in different contracting environments with a view to learn how firm-specific management practices are shaped and their portability across firms. Her works use field archival data to study the inner workings of firms.

She holds a Ph.D. in Accounting from Tilburg University. She has published research papers in journals such as The Accounting Review, Management Science, and Journal of Management Accounting Research.

Chung Yu Hung,墨尔本大学会计学助理教授。她的研究兴趣主要集中于公司内部的管理会计问题,特别是经济代理人(如经理和员工)在不同合同环境中的行为,以了解企业具体管理实践是如何形成的,以及它们在企业间的可移植性。她使用实地档案数据来研究公司的内部运作。

Chung Yu Hung于蒂尔堡大学取得会计学博士学位。她曾在《The Accounting Review》、《Management Science》和《Journal of Management Accounting Research》等期刊上发表学术论文。


We investigate circumstances in which referral-based hiring can exacerbate rather than mitigate agency problems. When incentive contracts cannot fully align employees’ incentives with the interests of the firm, employees may behave opportunistically. Referred job candidates likely obtain inside information from existing employees about opportunistic incentive responses and it is this information that exacerbates agency problems. Our research setting enables us to distinguish between referred and non-referred employees. It also features a context in which the incentive contract consists of two measures with different properties (efficiency and quality), which allow for opportunistic incentive responses, i.e., sacrificing quality for efficiency. We find that referred employees focus more on efficiency and less on quality than non-referred employees. We further document the persistence of this behavior and the differential departure likelihood of referred and non-referred employees. Our findings suggest that referral-based hiring can exacerbate agency problems when incentive contracts allow for opportunistic gains.