The Tax Gain of Reforming State-owned Enterprises 国企改革的税收红利

时间:2022-05-12         阅读:

光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6127期

主题The Tax Gain of Reforming State-owned Enterprises 国企改革的税收红利

主讲人中国人民大学财政金融学院 刘勇政教授

主持人澳门沙龙赌场财税学院 李建军教授

时间2022年5月12日(星期四)下午2:00

举办地点:腾讯会议:760-973-354会议密码:22512

主办单位:财政税务学院 科研处

主讲人简介:

刘勇政,中国人民大学财政金融学院教授。研究领域为财政学和发展经济学。研究成果发表于《中国社会科学》《经济研究》, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Urban Economics, Public Administration等国内外知名期刊上。主持国家社会科学基金重点项目、国家自然科学基金面上项目等多项科研项目。曾获中国留美经济学会“最佳青年经济学者奖”、“邹至庄最佳论文奖”、教育部高等澳门沙龙赌场科学研究优秀成果奖、北京市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖等。目前兼任Applied Economic Analysis(SSCI)、Economic and Political Studies期刊副主编。

内容提要:

This study examines the tax compliance effect of SOEs reform using a large dataset of Chinese industrial firms. By exploiting the variation in SOEs ownership change—oversight authority shifted from a one level government to either a lower one (i.e., decentralization) or to the private sector, we estimate a difference-in-differences model to find that both decentralization and privatization causes an increase in tax compliance as measured by effective tax rates. In addition, we find evidence that while the decentralization results are driven by the reduced distance between a decentralized SOE and its oversight government, the privatization results are solely because of the greater tax-scrutiny. Decentralization and privatization are often seen as strategies to improve efficiency in the affected markets. Our results suggest that governments also benefit from higher tax revenues induced by improvements in tax compliance.

本研究利用中国工业企业数据探讨了国有企业改革的税收遵从效应。通过利用国有企业所有权变化的变化——监管机构下移(即权力下放)或民营化,采用DID模型估计发现:权力下放和民营化都提高了以有效税率衡量的企业税收遵从。此外,权力下放的税收遵从效应是由分权的国有企业与其监督机构之间的距离缩小所驱动的,但民营化的税收遵从效应主要来自更大的税收监管。分权化和民营化通常被视为提高市场效率的举措;而我们的研究结果表明,政府同时收益于其带来的企业税收遵从的改善所引起的更高的税收收入。